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Abstract: In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be
rationally persuaded (WTRBP). A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling
between two vices – never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also
helps address problems phronêsis faces in light of implicit bias research.
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1. Introduction
To outline my approach in this paper and shed some light on what I see to be some contributions
and limits of the discussion to follow, I would like to begin by explaining a little bit about the
motivations behind preparing it.
The main motivation is a fascination with people who will not change a settled upon belief
or intention no matter the reasons presented for them to do so. I think we are all at least somewhat
familiar with attempting to argue with someone, either about their (potential) actions or beliefs,
but then finding ourselves stonewalled by their unwillingness to be rationally persuaded.1 As
Thomas Paine wrote: “To argue with a [person] who has renounced the use and authority of reason
[…] is like administering medicine to the dead, or endeavoring to convert an atheist by scripture.”
And more technically, as Andrea Rocci once commented: “A willingness to be persuaded seems
to be a precondition for rationality.”
I am also most interested in practical reasoning – reasoning to intention or action – as
opposed to theoretical reasoning – reasoning to belief or determining what is the case. I have two
general reasons for this preference. First (but not most important), within the study of
argumentation there is noticeably less work on practical reasoning. Most often, the theoretical is
taken as the paradigm and the practical is treated just as a special case of the theoretical: reasoning
or arguing to a belief about what to do.2 The second, related reason, is that they are importantly
different. In my experience, people may hold all kinds of crazy beliefs and I never notice. In the
silence of one’s mind beliefs come and go change and develop all the time without me having any
idea. However, when someone acts there is an observable immediacy and permanence to their
actions which impacts themselves and those around them. A person with racist beliefs but who
nonetheless does not take racist actions is importantly different from one who practices racist
discrimination. To be sure, however, and as will be addressed briefly below, there is important –
1

How this refusal manifests is open-ended and would be an excellent topic for further research, especially in terms of
extremist reasoning.
2
I conceive of practical reasoning as concluding in an intention rather than a belief. One may believe they ought to
do something, but it does not necessarily follow that they then intend to do it. I may believe that I ought to do the
dishes, but getting to the intention to do them is something else.
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though unclear – overlap between the practical and theoretical. Here, I am not meaning to neglect
the importance of the theoretical, but simply highlight the importance of the practical.
In sum, the motivation for this work spawns from observing the refusal to accept or
acknowledge reasons and their authority resulting in the performance of (or intention to perform)
one or more bad decisions.
As for the limits of the paper, through my investigations into hard-headedness I was led to
discussions of open-mindedness. It then quickly became clear that almost all discussions of openmindedness occurred within or led to work on virtue. Exploring the virtue literature while
maintaining my focus on the practical, led to the notion of phronêsis. As such, in what follows I
try to work within and contribute to what has come to be known as the virtue approach to
argumentation, while maintaining a focus on the practical. I am doing so with the knowledge that
I am setting aside an important and vast contemporary literature regarding both practical reasoning
and a number of other developed approaches to argumentation which do not take up the virtue
banner. I do so not because there is anything wrong with the other approaches, but because virtue
is the forum where the most developed discussion of the topic at hand has occurred and nothing
says that developing ideas here leaves them inapplicable or unusable elsewhere.
To proceed, then, I will begin by briefly characterizing phronêsis, outlining how it is
acquired, and pointing to what I see as a few unaddressed difficulties for the notion. In section 3,
I will propose a definition of a willingness to be rationally persuaded (hereafter WTBRP) and
unpack the definition in distinction with open-mindedness (hereafter OM). The concluding section
will argue that the notion of a WTBRP is more fundamental than phronêsis for bringing about the
good and that speaking in terms of a WTBRP alleviates criticisms which have been launched
against the notion of OM. Without further ado, then, we will now turn to our discussion of
phronêsis.
2. Phronêsis
The term phronêsis is most often translated as either “common sense” or “practical wisdom” and
is most readily distinguishable from “theoretical wisdom” (Ryan 2014). Whereas theoretical
wisdom is characteristic of the philosopher and deals with necessary truths and the understanding
of the universe, practical wisdom is characteristic of the political leader/ruler (Surprenant 2012;
Kraut 2014 p. 44ff) and deals with the means to achieving good goals: “Virtue makes the goal
right; phronêsis is responsible only for what contributes to the goal. That is, practical intellect does
not tell us what ends to pursue, but only how to pursue them; our ends themselves are set by our
ethical characters” (Moss 2011, p. 205).
Despite being called “practical” wisdom, however, phronêsis is still considered an
intellectual rather than an ethical/character virtue. As intellectual it can be considered a theoretical
part of practical wisdom and in this way constitutes part of the overlap between the practical and
theoretical mentioned above.3 To contrast, as mentioned, the ethical virtues instruct what the right
thing to do is – be honest, courageous, compassionate, etc. These and other virtues fulfil what is
known as the “doctrine of the mean” which indicates that they fall between the two extremes of
deficiency and excess. For example, courage as a virtue can be considered to fall between the
deficient extreme of cowardice and the excessive extreme of rashness. Phronêsis, on the other
hand, is an intellectual virtue in that it helps determine the best way to achieve ethical virtues but
3
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also helps to sort out conflicts between the virtues in particular instances. For example, there may
be a conflict between honesty which may be hurtful and compassion which may be dishonest.
Accordingly, “A person who has acquired phronêsis has thus, inter alia, the wisdom to adjudicate
the relative weight of different virtues in conflict situations and to reach a measured verdict about
best courses of action” (Kristjánsson 2014, p. 155; Kraut 2014, p. 15). In this way, phronêsis both
completes the ethical virtues and functions as a meta-virtue by reigning over them (Kristjánsson
2014, p. 159. See also Hursthouse 2013; Kraut 2014).
As for acquisition, Aristotle tell us that the ethical virtues are acquired during childhood
through habituation and that phronêsis comes later, through experience (1142a12-1142a21). As
such, phronêsis is conceived of as a paternalistic virtue – unavailable to the young (1143b61143b14).4 Importantly, however, both the ethical virtues and phronêsis are described as learned
virtues which can be developed and improved over time. Kristjánsson (2014) explains that,
The standard developmental story about the trajectory of moral virtue and phronesis
[…] all starts with habituation: best defined as an intentional process of inculcation
of character through the exercise of action and reaction in a repetitive pattern under
outside guidance (see Lawrence, 2011: 249). Gradually, however, that initial
process – which is basically non-rational and achieved via conditioning – is
superseded by a rational process whereby learners continue to be conditioned, but
through a conditioning that is accompanied by description and explanation –
leading, over time, to the formation of the learners’ own phronesis. (p. 156)
Although phronêsis can be learned, it is important to note that it is not a decision procedure (Curzer
2015; Kraut 2014). One who acquires phronêsis has not learned a method of deliberation, but
rather, has acquired a certain ability to “see” the solution. Kraut (2014) explains that
To say that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of registering the point
that the good person's reasoning does succeed in discovering what is best in each
situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in the sense that his views
should be regarded as authoritative by other members of the community. A standard
or measure is something that settles disputes; and because good people are so
skilled at discovering the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought and
heeded. (pp. 19-20)
Further, this characterization of the practically wise person as a dispute settler whose
advice is sought and heeded, is exactly why phronêsis is the virtue of the political leader or ruler
concerned with government and action rather than the philosopher who is concerned with first
truths and understanding the universe.
Thinking of the practically wise as one who knows what to do in ethically tricky situations
and who can figure out or see the best way to achieve good ends is rather appealing and fits with
intuitions about what makes a good leader and how experience can separate the old and wise from
the young and, perhaps good, but still ignorant or naïve. However, looking at this characterization

Aristotle advises: “Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and
older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them
an eye they see aright” [1143b6-1143b14].
4
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with contemporary glasses, not to judge it, but merely to consider the implications of its
contemporary application, brings a few problems to the fore.
First, recent research into implicit biases has revealed that what we often “see” to be the
right answer or what we do seemingly naturally can be wrought with biases and poor reasoning
which can lead to ethically bad or questionable decisions and conduct (cf. Kahneman 2011; Peters,
et al, 2000; Baumtrog 2015, pp. 127-136). Importantly, there is also no conclusive evidence that
age or experience are sufficient to counteract these factors. For example, Strough and colleagues
(2011) report that while the sunk cost fallacy does decrease with age, the framing effect remains
stable from middle adolescence to late adulthood.5 Even directly teaching about problematic biases
might not be enough to counteract them. Kenyon & Beaulac (2014) argue that simply teaching
awareness about biases is relatively ineffective in preventing them but that “[a] range of strategies
[do] work to varying degrees, depending on the bias” (p. 347).
To illustrate, there is no evidence that having experience in particular cases helps in
avoiding biases like the availability bias. In fact, it is exactly the availability bias which causes us
to over-emphasise recent and salient events (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; 1974, pp. 1127-8;
Kahnemean 2011, pp. 129ff). Thus, even a leader with phrônesis could give too much
consideration to temporally close and salient events at the expense of a broader and more accurate
statistical analysis. While working with groups has been shown to help counteract the availability
bias (Sunstein and Hastie 2015, p. 53), as we have seen, the one with phronêsis is the standard of
judgement and dispute settler and as such is not subject to the challenge of others.
Second, in many parts of the world, though sadly not all, the days of the ruler are now over.
This means that instead of one political leader, there are many. Moreover, it is not a stretch to
imagine that more than one of these leaders could be said to have acquired phronêsis. In a
democratic setting where leaders disagree, which one is to be considered the standard and
measure? Surprenant (2012) argues that
all of these participants would possess “a share of excellence and practical wisdom”
when acting as co-legislators (Pol 1281b4). Thus, “when they meet together, just
as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses,
so too with regard to character and thought” (Pol 1281b5-7). Like the individual
citizen whose judgment or opinion becomes phronesis when occupying the position
of ruler, each citizen in a democracy has a share in legislative process, and so
likewise has a share in phronesis” (p. 224).
Unfortunately, however, as ideal and optimistic as this sharing in phronêsis sounds, it has been
shown to be highly unlikely to ever occur. As Sunstein and Hastie (2015) have shown, groups may
amplify biases and errors and run a greater risk of making the wrong decisions than working
together to achieve wisdom.
Of course it is possible for people who disagree to come to agree and at least some biases
may be mitigated. However, learning dispute resolution and debiasing techniques are not
articulated as a part of the acquisition of phronêsis. On the contrary, experience is expected to
mitigate bias and the one with phronêsis is understood to be the dispute settler by decree, which

5
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does not leave room for the mutual continuance of disagreement required for its eventual rational
resolution.
For the sake of the argument, however, even if we imagine a best case scenario where these
two abilities - disagreement resolution among other equally wise people and effective debiasing are also included in the training leading to phronêsis, there still seems to be a more foundational
virtue required for their successful implementation. That virtue, I argue, is the willingness to be
rationally persuaded. The political leader in training would have to already be willing to be
persuaded to sincerely engage in the rational resolution of a difference of opinion and would have
to be willing to be persuaded that a decision they (cannot help but) come to results from an implicit
bias and should be changed. Without a willingness to be persuaded, neither of these outcomes
would be possible.
At this point, you may be thinking, “you’re talking about the ruler being open-minded!”
and in a casual conversation, I would probably say you are right. But since this is an academic
philosophical work, this is an appropriate venue for expressing that I think there is a benefit to
using a more precise notion like a willingness to be rationally persuaded. Let me explain why.
3. A willingness to be rationally persuaded and open-mindedness
I consider a willingness to be rationally persuaded to be: a self-governing quasi-policy of an agent
to submit to the power of recognizably rational reason(s) in overcoming the inertia of an absent
or held, belief or intention, whenever practically viable and/or exceptionally important.
Clearly, this definition needs some unpacking. To help unpack the definition I will address
each of its component parts in order, but do so in explicit relation to OM. I will also try to show
some of the interplay between the component parts as we proceed. This process will serve the
double function of helping to clarify what a WTBRP is as well as to distinguish it from its broader
relative.
First, the notion of a “self-governing quasi-policy” comes from Michael Bratman (1987,
pp. 56-57; 2007) who incorporates policies into an entire philosophy of human agency and
practical reasoning. Briefly, for him polices “are intentions that are appropriately general in their
content. They support treating, over time, like cases in like ways, and doing this as a matter of (and
so, with reference to one’s) policy” (Bratman 2007, p. 6). The qualification of quasi-policy
indicates a WTBRP’s status as a higher-order policy – not aimed at each and every particular
instantiation – which prevents it from being held to the same standards of consistency and
coherence as a first-order policy (pp. 42-44).6
I think Philosophers working on OM would generally agree with including this feature for
that notion as well. In particular, this framing seems more or less consistent with Adler’s view of
OM as “a second-order (or ‘meta’) attitude toward one’s beliefs as believed, and not just toward
the specific proposition believed” (2004 p. 130) which he also links directly to the notion of a
policy (p. 132). In this way, for Adler OM is also an attitude toward oneself (like a self-governing
quasi-policy) rather than toward a specific belief. Similarly, Bratman’s ideas also generally fit with
Higgins’ (2009) description of subliminal OM as a “full and lingering perception” (pp. 46-47) that
“represent[s] a sort of meta or organizing virtue” (p. 58).
6

Compare, for example, having a first-order policy to go for a run every morning but deciding one morning not to against a higher-order policy to be monetarily charitable but not giving to a charity worker you pass on the street one
time. In the first instance the policy of going for a run has clearly been broken, but the case is not so clear in the second
instance. Similarly, a policy to be willing to be rationally persuaded may admit of exceptions without losing its punch.
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There are, however, important upshots to using Bratman’s developed characterization of
policy. First, doing so grounds the notion in an established realm of research which consequentially
also immediately allows us to start to make sense of how a WTBRP and OM can apply beyond the
realm of beliefs and into the realm of intentions. In addition, it provides inroads for future research
to develop the notion in relation to other philosophical streams such as articulating the role that a
WTBRP can play in human agency. Thus, using this notion can be useful for developing both OM
– insofar as it is/remains conceived of in terms of a policy – and a WTBRP.
The second part of my proposed definition requires the agent submit to the power of
recognizably rational reason(s).7 The main thrust behind this stipulation is to avoid extra/nonrational or irrational reasons from counting as rational persuasion. What counts as a “recognizably
rational reason” is a deeply philosophic topic which I do not pretend to answer here. For present
purposes it will do to take up an intuitive notion of what counts as recognizably rational and
consider it a basic qualification inexplicable in more fundamental terms – an approach also taken
up by Scanlon (1998 p. 17ff) and Searle (2001 pp. 117-118).
It should be noted, however, that I do not currently see any major issues with strengthening
this requirement, especially if the context calls for it. For example, one could count recognizably
rational as meeting the conditions of Siegel’s (1988; 2009) reasons assessment component of
critical thinking. In addition, certain institutions – such as in law – have regulations for what counts
as rational (or reasonable) and those regulations could be inserted into the definition if need be.
The overall point is that the reasons must be at least recognizably rational – but more detailed
accounts of what should fall under this label remain open for debate.
Including this stipulation also addresses concerns raised in nearly every article on OM –
that an agent could be too open-minded, too credulous, which could be epistemically detrimental
(see for example, Cohen and Miller 2008; Kwong 2016). Requiring recognizable rationality begins
a sort of filtering of the influences that could lead to a change of belief or intention too easily. This
requirement works in co-operation with the third part of my proposed definition, so I will now
move on to that one and re-address this concern there.
The third component specifies that the policy of being willing to submit to recognizably
rational reason be used “to overcome the inertia of an absent or held, belief or intention.” First the
notion of inertia is meant to help explicate the idea that the status quo has force. Whether absent
or held, a (potential) belief or intention should not be overcome willy-nilly. At minimum, the takeup or change of a belief or intention requires the force of a positive recognizably rational reason.
If you have never thought about a topic and are thus neutral in respect to supporting or opposing
it, it should require at least one positive reason for you to adopt a position this way or that. Mere
awareness of one position rather than another, or arbitrarily picking without a reason, is outside of
rational persuasion.
This stipulation further helps address the concern raised above that being open-minded
could be epistemically detrimental, especially in cases where a true belief is held. The objection
has it that if one is open-minded about a true belief s/he runs the risk of erroneously abandoning
it. In the present characterization, a true belief would ideally carry an unsurmountable level of
inertia.8 As such, maintaining a WTBRP against a true belief may have other benefits but it would
not risk its abandonment. For example, epistemically, it may allow both arguers to uncover deeper

I am not yet sure if the stronger requirement of submitting to recognizably rational reason – as a cover noun – should
be used here instead. Consideration of this option will have to await a future work.
8
I am not yet sure about how this would apply to an intention.
7
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and more complex reasoning in support of the belief, and socio-politically, it would allow the
dissident the chance to be heard and taken seriously.
Taken together with a willingness to submit to recognizably rational reasons, the
requirement to overcome the inertia of an absent or held, belief or intention, also explains how a
WTBRP may be seen to fulfil the doctrine of the mean.9 It prevents the agent from being too
credulous while also all preventing them from being too hard-headed. Nothing about the “open”
in open-mindedness signals a hesitation or restriction on belief or intention change without specific
stipulation. Rather than “open” minded, a WTBRP could better be described as “filter” minded –
a title never explicitly used but consonant with many OM descriptions and (re)articulations (Hare
2006, 2009, 2011; Baehr 2011; Adler 2004; Cohen 2008; Kwong 2016; Riggs 2010).
The end of my definition calls for an agent to be WTBRP “whenever practically viable
and/or exceptionally important.” This component fits together with and narrows down (albeit only
slightly) the expanse of the policy coverage. “Whenever practically viable” is meant to save the
agent from the unrealistic expectation to always be WTBRP – sometimes there just isn’t time –
and the term “willingness” in a WTBRP should not be understood as entailing an obligation to
engage.
The “whenever practically viable” condition also addresses a concern Baehr (2011, pp.
203ff) raises regarding the difference between being willing to be OM and having the ability to be
OM. Here, if you are unable to be WTBRP, it is clearly not viable and thus you are excused without
having to bear accusations of being unvirtuous: the virtue simply does not apply. I think this rings
true with the intuition that we ought not to fault someone for failing to do something outside of
their ability.
The “and/or whenever exceptionally important” clause is added to ensure that when the
stakes are high, due consideration is emphasised. There are of course tricky situations of tension
between the viability and importance condition. For example, consider a commander who has to
decide whether to send troops into battle. In such an instance, a decision may need to be reached
quickly which takes away from the practical viability, but since the stakes are so high it becomes
more crucial to maintain a WTBRP. I don’t have a clear solution to these rare cases,10 but hope
that placing both aspects of viability and importance in the definition at least helps identify that
both factors should be taken into account when deciding to favour one or the other.
Finally, these two factors taken together are also meant to address a pair of concerns that
one cannot and should not be OM about every proposition all of the time and that OM may require
newly initiated investigation into held but unquestioned beliefs. The stipulations I have presented
prevent one from having to question everything or actively investigate unquestioned beliefs. On
the story forwarded here, an intention or belief only needs to be assessed under a WTBRP when it
is brought to attention and placed in conflict with the status quo. This is not because I do not see
value in more questioning or actively searching out held beliefs to improve, but only because I
think such a task is better described on its own terms as a willingness to inquire. Discussion
pertaining to what is involved in a willingness to inquire would address issues not pertinent for a

9

Although the doctrine of the mean typically applies to ethical virtues, it seems valuable here as well.
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would also pair well with the open issue regarding an arguer’s dialectical obligations (Johnson 2000).
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WTBRP such as the scope of what should be inquired about, the appropriate depth of inquiry, the
duration of inquiry, and how curiosity might kill the cat (cf. Hamby 2014, p. 69).11
4. Conclusion
To conclude, in this paper I hope to have successfully made the case for two claims: 1) there is a
more foundational virtue than phrônesis required for determining how to bring about the good
which I call a willingness to be rationally persuaded, and 2) though very similar, it is worthwhile
to distinguish a willingness to be rationally persuaded from the broader notion of being openminded.
If experiential wisdom is not enough to guarantee coming to the best determination for how
to bring about the good, and if two practically wise people might disagree, then maintaining a
WTBRP is more foundational than phronêsis in this pursuit.
Further, the notion of open-mindedness has been subject to some understandable criticisms,
such as placing epistemic quality at risk and being too vague regarding its scope of application.
The name open-mindedness is also not indicative of the characterizations philosophers have
stipulated for it. Speaking in terms of a willingness to be rationally persuaded preserves some of
the essential features of OM such as taking opposing considerations seriously while also refining
it to avoid some of the criticisms. Further, characterizing a WTBRP in the way I have grounds it
in other developed and developing philosophy which provides a strong basis for continued research
and development of the central ideas.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to the attendees of the ArgLab research colloquium –
operating as a part of the “Values in Argumentative Discourse" series [FCT-funded project
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